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IT TAKES A MILITIA: A COMMUNITARIAN CASE FOR
COMPULSORY ARMS BEARING

Brannon P. Denning[*]
Glenn Harlan Reynolds[**]
During the last year, both Communitarianism and private militias have received a
considerable amount of attention in the popular press and in law reviews; nevertheless, few
observers have discussed the similarities between these two seemingly dissimilar movements. In
this Essay, the authors demonstrate that Communitarians and militias actually have more in
common than it might at first appear. Summarizing the Communitarian agenda, the authors note
that Communitarians speak a language that would be readily understood by the Framers, who
saw militias as an important vehicle through which civic virtue could be transmitted. The
importance the Framers placed upon militias is evidenced by the prominence given to them in the
text of the Constitution and in the Second Amendment.
As the authors point out, however, not only do Communitarians fail to acknowledge the
connection between their ideology and the classical militia, their platform exhibits a hostility
towards the rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment that is at odds with
Communitarianism's other tenets. The authors argue that, as traditionally constituted, militias
reinforce the same civic virtues that Communitarianism wishes to restore, while at the same time
offering to individuals security against tyranny. The decline of the classical militia, say the
authors, has led to a renewed interest in the Second Amendment and even the "neomilitia"
movement as people search for something to fill the void left by the demise of the militia of
republican ideology. That this point is ignored by Communitarians perhaps says something about
Communitarianism that its proponents would rather not acknowledge.(p.186)

***
"We join with those who read the Second Amendment the way it was written, as a
Communitarian clause, calling for community militias, not individual gunslingers."--The
Communitarian Platform[1]
INTRODUCTION
Political discourse in recent years has been dominated by two topics that seemingly have
little in common. One is the growth of a "Communitarian" movement among scholars; the other
is the growth of a "militia movement" among citizens who, for the most part, are not very
scholarly. The two movements would appear to be incompatible, to say the least. Communitarians
speak and write about the responsibility of government to foster virtue and responsibility among
its citizens;[2] militia members speak ominously of the need to resist the encroachment of
government.[3] Yet appearances, in this case at least, are deceptive. As
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this Essay demonstrates, there is something of a nexus between the self-styled citizensoldiers of the militia movement and the self-styled virtuous citizens of Communitarianism.
Seen as an attractive alternative to the "radical individualism" of our society,
Communitarianism appeals to those on the left[4] as well as the right.[5]
Communitarianism is touted as a viable third way between a societal egocentrism and a
more dangerous collectivism.[6] Along with interest in "civic republicanism"[7] among
legal academics like Frank Michelman,[8] Cass Sunstein,[9] and Mary Ann Glendon,[10]
Communitarianism promises to mediate (p.187)between the desires of the individual and the
good of the larger community. Communitarians believe that, properly employed, the
government not only can influence moral behavior among its citizens but that it has an
obligation to do so.[11] In other words, Communitarians believe that not only can
government legislate morality, but that in many settings it ought to.[12]
Contrast such a positive view of government with the often virulent anti-government
rhetoric espoused by many in the so-called "militia movement."[13] Under scrutiny like
never before[14] --particularly in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing case in which
the prime suspects have alleged "links" to militia groups in Michigan[15] --most people
now associate militias with the "angry white male"[16] or with what historian Richard
Hofstadter once referred to as the "paranoid style in American politics."[17] Not
surprisingly, the extravagant claims of various members of these neomilitias[18] and (p.188)
their hostility toward the federal government and its agents[19] have caused alarm among
members of the press[20] and among lawmakers.[21](p.189)
What most people (including many neomilitia members) fail to appreciate is that not
so very long ago service in one's local militia was as much an expression of civic
commitment as voting or serving on a jury.[22] Further, the anti-government bent of many
of these neomilitias obscures the true origins and intended role of the militia.[23] Likewise,
the role of the militia in civic life is largely overlooked both by Communitarians[24] and by
those law professors advocating a reevaluation of "civic republicanism."[25] Far from
attempting to reintroduce the militia into state and local civic life, the Communitarian
platform, drafted by movement founder Amitai Etzioni, University of Maryland professor
of public affairs William Galston,[26] and Harvard law professor Mary Ann Glendon, calls
for domestic disarmament to counter the "clear and present danger" that it claims guns
present to the health and safety of Americans.[27] This Communitarian hostility toward
private ownership of guns,[28] as well as a continued unwillingness to acknowledge the
possible utility of reinvigorating state and local militias, is inconsistent with the tenets of
their philosophy. In fact, it seems evident that militias embody the very ideal of the
Communitarian project and that (p.190)Communitarians' reluctance to embrace the militia and
to attempt to remake it as it once was--an essential civic institution--ensures the
continuation of a Gresham's law[29] of guns and militias in which the bad inevitably drives
out the good. Further, the rise of neomilitias represents a dark side of Communitarianism
that its enthusiasts seem unwilling to acknowledge.[30]
The failure of both Communitarians and militia theorists to acknowledge these issues
indicates a great deal about the narrowness of their respective views regarding both
community and arms-bearing. It also indicates some unfortunate things about the state of
constitutional discourse today.[31] This Essay briefly summarizes the history and
viewpoints of the Communitarian movement--including its express statement that armsbearing should be understood in the context of militias--and the surprisingly
Communitarian history of militias themselves. This Essay then suggests solutions to
contemporary problems involving arms-bearing and militias that are unlikely to please
either mainstream Communitarians or members of neomilitia groups, but that nonetheless
should be considered.
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I. THE COMMUNITARIAN MOVEMENT
A. Communitarian First Principles
While influential critiques of liberalism have come in the last few years from Jean
Bethke Elshtain[32] and the late Christopher Lasch,[33] the driving force behind
Communitarianism is Amitai Etzioni, professor of sociology at George Washington
University. Etzioni envisioned Communitarianism as a transpartisan political movement
bringing together those from various ideological camps to forge a national community.[34]
Etzioni brought together law professors, philosophers, and other social scientists at a
conference in 1990 to formulate principles for this "ideology of the nineties."[35] The group
founded a quarterly journal devoted to the promulgation of Communitarian (p.191)thinking
[36] and drew up a platform of principles.[37]
Communitarianism seeks to change an entire way of thinking about the citizen's
relationship to the government.[38] Instead of the us-versus-them "rights-talk" common to
our modern society,[39] the Communitarians seek to encourage the citizen to see her fate as
inexorably linked to that of her fellow neighbors, coworkers, and citizens at the local, state,
and national level. As Etzioni wrote in his book The Spirit of Community, Communitarians
"adopted the name ... to emphasize that the time had come to attend to our responsibilities
to the conditions and elements we all share, to the community."[40] With rights, the
Communitarians remind us, come responsibilities, and the latter, they believe, are
overlooked in the rush to secure new rights for increasingly atomized groups of individuals.
[41] Not only has such radical individualism taken its toll on the moral fabric of the
country,[42] with alarming increases in illegitimacy and divorce,[43] but due to "excessive
regard" for the institution of private property, things like the environment have suffered as
well.[44]
Contemporary law already recognizes that everyone's exercise of rights necessarily
requires limits,[45] but this balancing takes place largely in courts and out of sight of the
lay community, thus tending to keep hidden the application of limits to one's rights.[46]
Further, despite what goes on in the courts, our political dialogue of rights tends to be
absolute. "Rights-talk," then, takes the form of a zero-sum conversation in which, according
to Communitarians, every admission of limits is seen as a surrender.[47] Communitarians
seek to make plain that the exercise of rights entails the (p.192)acceptance of responsibilities
and that rights themselves have limits.[48]
The Communitarian project is an ambitious one; it seeks to change the way Americans
think about their relationship to others. It seeks, in the words of the Communitarian
platform, to "recognize[] both individual human dignity and the social dimensions of human
existence."[49] It eschews simple majoritarianism but emphasizes its support for democratic
solutions to common societal problems.[50] Communitarianism seeks to restore America's
"moral voice"[51] through the use of non-governmental social units through which values
have been traditionally transmitted: neighborhoods, churches, families, and the public
schools.[52] Moreover, Communitarians advocate direct action at the smallest societal unit
capable of addressing societal problems. Their platform states that
no social task should be assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do
the job. What can be done by families should not be assigned to an intermediate
group--school, etc. What can be done at the local level should not be passed on to
the state or federal level, and so on.[53](p.193)
Further, members of the community ought not hesitate to "speak up and express our
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moral concerns to others when it comes to issues we care about deeply and share with
one another."[54] In addition, obligations such as that of community service ought to be
institutionalized as a way to inculcate the young with community ideals as well as offering
other members of the community the opportunity to "foster mutual respect and tolerance"
for those from different backgrounds.[55] Thus, Communitarian first principles encourage
(1) the use of social, as opposed to necessarily governmental, units to address social
problems at the smallest level possible and (2) the involvement of the largest number of
community members possible in transmitting the community's values to younger
generations.
The Communitarian platform also encourages "duties to the polity."[56] Those duties
include staying informed about matters of concern to the community;[57] voting, so as to
ensure that the representatives retain a sufficient identity of interest with the community's
constituent members;[58] paying taxes;[59] and serving on juries.[60] The platform
encourages a recognition that possessing the "right to do X" does not mean that "X is the
right thing ... to do."[61] Forbearance both in speech and in actions toward one's fellow
citizens will help foster "social justice," which requires the presence of "responsible
individuals in a responsive community."[62] In addition to the responsibility to their local
communities, Communitarian citizens also have a responsibility to the larger "community"-the polity.[63]
B. Communitarians and Guns
Because Communitarians realize they cannot rely solely on the good will of citizens to
counter the effects of radical individualism, they call for narrowed judicial interpretations of
rights to take into account the "need to protect the health and safety of the public."[64] This
includes, among other things, allowing the community to take action to prevent the spread
of AIDS[65] and "domestic disarmament" to protect the community from intentional (p.194)
or accidental deaths inflicted through the use of firearms.[66] This empowering of the
community to take collective action in ways that might marginalize the dignity of
individuals or abrogate certain constitutional rights (such as domestic disarmament) has
given some commentators pause.[67]
The Communitarian solution with regard to guns is puzzling, and it is inconsistent
with proposed Communitarian solutions to society's other ills. Elsewhere in his book, for
example, Etzioni indicates that he would rely on social pressure and community education,
what he terms "suasion," as opposed to governmental regulation to encourage the
responsible exercise of rights.[68] Further, Etzioni emphasizes that the government's power
ought to be used only as a last resort and not merely because the exercise of certain rights is
deleterious to the public.[69] Yet the proposed Communitarian solution to gun violence
shows no such restraint. Such a rush to criminalize gun ownership certainly smacks of the
authoritarian approach that Etzioni disclaims.[70] (p.195)This approach is also inconsistent
with the Communitarian platform, which allegedly calls for a "Communitarian"
interpretation of the Second Amendment.[71] One will find no plan for implementing such
an interpretation in Etzioni's book,[72] however, and there is little mention of it in other
Communitarian literature.[73] This Essay supplies such an interpretation, although it is
doubtful that the call for such an approach was meant to be acted upon. Yet, taken
seriously, a Communitarian approach to community militias raises some interesting
questions, especially about Communitarianism itself.
To support the claim that armed militias might serve to uphold the aims of
Communitarianism, one first needs to realize that arms-bearing and militias traditionally
were not the purview of disaffected fringe elements. On the contrary, the militias of the
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the community. Operating with the
imprimatur of state governments, an armed citizenry was regarded not as a dangerous
crowd of gunslingers but as a necessary precondition to a virtuous republic.
II. MILITIAS AND THE COMMUNITARIAN IDEAL
A. A Brief History of the Militia in the United States
Though largely forgotten, militias were once an important institution in America.[74]
The Constitution, for example, mentions militias in several places,[75] most notably in the
Bill of Rights.[76] James Madison considered the (p.196)militia to be one of the bulwarks of
American liberty.[77] Madison's sentiment was echoed by the famous nineteenth century
constitutional commentators Joseph Story[78] and Thomas Cooley.[79] But what was the
"militia" of which the Framers wrote? In a nutshell, the Framers' militias were "comprised
[of] all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense,"[80] or, in
other words, they were "citizens primarily, soldiers on occasion."[81]
Militias were part of an inherited, English, radical Whig ideology vigorously opposed
to "standing armies"--those armies comprised of professional soldiers--as being inimical to
the liberties of the people.[82] The historian (p.197)J.G.A. Pocock described the tradition as
a civic and patriot ideal in which the personality was founded in property, perfected
in citizenship but perpetually threatened by corruption; government figuring
paradoxically as the principal source of corruption and operating through such
means as patronage, faction, standing armies (opposed to the ideal of the militia),
established churches (opposed to the Puritan and deist modes of American religion)
and the promotion of a monied interest .... Not all Americans were schooled in this
tradition, but there was (it would almost appear) no alternative tradition in which to
be schooled.[83]
Not surprisingly, this Whig tradition, also called republicanism or civic republicanism,[84]
is an intellectual antecedent of Communitarianism.[85]
Independent militias were sometimes organized prior to the Revolution, in part as a
counterweight to the Tory-controlled regular militias,[86] and worked closely with the
military force of the Continental Army.[87] During the Revolutionary War, these colonial
militias performed admirably,[88] particularly when operating close to their home towns
and villages, although they often were disparaged by professional military officers as illdisciplined and unsuited for extended campaigning. This clearly illustrates that militias
were primarily intended to be defensive; indeed, those who refused to leave their homes and
towns still played an important role in preventing any counterrevolutionary activity from
establishing a foothold. Nevertheless, as Professor Robert Cottrol has written, it is
important to keep in mind "that the armed population and the militia were intended to serve
more than a simple military function. They were seen as fulfilling political and perhaps
moral purposes as well."[89] This latter point seems lost on most modern critiques (p.198)of
the militia as an institution, which seem solely concerned with the militia's military
capabilities, or lack thereof.[90]
As previously mentioned,[91] the militia was featured prominently in the text of the
Constitution, and heated debates occurred regarding the extent of federal government
control over the state militias.[92] In the end, there was a compromise:[93] the federal
government retained the power to call up the militia and to prescribe its training;[94] the
states retained the power over the militia members' actual training and could prescribe the
method by which officers were chosen.[95]
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Initially, Congress took seriously its responsibility toward the militia,[96] passing an
act in 1792 that detailed uniform standards for the militia of all (p.199)states, down to the
number of rounds of ammunition a militiaman was expected to have on hand.[97] As
Hamilton foresaw,[98] by the mid-nineteenth century, the militia had declined.[99] The
federal government came to rely more on a professional military, and the states simply were
unwilling to shoulder the financial burden of maintaining militias.[100] Nevertheless, the
militia was still seen as a valuable community institution.[101] The decline, no doubt,
accelerated as the United States began to aspire to empire in the late nineteenth century.
National authorities, frustrated by their inability to send state militias outside the country's
boundaries, sought a new organization--one that could remain under the nominal control of
the states until such time as it was called into service of the United States.[102] In 1909, the
National Guard was born.(p.200)
B. The National Guard and the Death of the Universal Militia
The Dick Act,[103] passed in 1903, "signified the ... [end] of the old, ... statecontrolled, system"[104] by introducing significant federal requirements for the training and
equipping of state militias. The National Defense Act of 1908[105] followed the Dick Act
and authorized the use of the newly constituted "National Guard" to serve outside the
boundaries of the United States.[106]
Congress passed another national defense act[107] in 1916 as part of general
preparedness in the face of an escalating European war. Among the increased requirements
placed upon the states (and upon the United States Army, the administrator of the
requirements) was an innovative solution to the constitutional prohibition against the
foreign use of militia troops: the President was authorized to draft state Guard members into
national service as federal reserve troops.[108] Furthermore, the National Defense Act of
1916, which acted as a condition precedent to the states' receipt of federal funds, forced the
states to cede most of whatever control they retained over the militia, including the
constitutional prerogative to appoint officers to command the militia.[109] As one
commentator has noted, "A recurring fact (p.201)pattern emerges: the states, faced with ever
more demanding standards but unable to pay for upgrading, are forced to accept both
federal funding and the resulting loss of control that goes along with that funding."[110]
This pattern continued into the 1930s with the establishment of a "dual enlistment
policy," whereby each member of a state National Guard unit simultaneously became a
member of the United States National Guard.[111] Though militia members retained their
status as members of the state National Guard, Congress could order them into actual
service for the United States[112] whenever it declared a national emergency. During such
service, members lost their status as members of the state National Guard.[113]
In 1952, Congress removed the national emergency requirement as a prerequisite for
federal control of state militias and, instead, authorized federal control for "training"
purposes regardless of the existence of national emergency.[114] This power was subject to
gubernatorial approval, a requirement removed in the mid-1980s by a Congressional
amendment precipitated by some governors' refusal to send forces to train in Central
America.[115] Thus, in less than a century, state militia systems were dismantled
piecemeal; what remains today is, at best, a "select militia" which, because it lacks universal
membership, would be viewed by the Framers as little better than a standing army.[116]
More ominously, the destruction of state militias removed an important civilian check upon
federal military power:
By providing for a militia in the Constitution, the Framers sought to strengthen
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civilian control of the military. They postulated that a militia composed of citizensoldiers would curb any unseemly ambitions of the small standing army. Today's
National Guard is often perceived as the successor (p.202)to the militia, and
observers still tout the Guard's role as the ultimate restraint on the professional
military.
The reality, however, is much different. Today's National Guard is a very
different force from the colonial-era militia. With 178,000 full-time federal
employees and almost all of its budget drawn from the federal government, the
National Guard is, for all practical purposes, a federal force.[117]
C. Mandatory Militias?
Despite some interest in militias in the early twentieth century[118] and more recently
in a few communities around the country,[119] the federal government, and the populace in
general, seems uninterested in reestablishing a universal militia.[120] Nevertheless, a
Communitarian approach to the Second Amendment that focuses on the Constitution's
militia clauses makes a case that Congress is obligated to provide the states with the ability
to maintain a militia that the Framers would recognize, rather than merely providing for the
operation of the National Guard.
If one accepts the Communitarian platform's community-oriented approach,[121] it
can be argued plausibly that the Second Amendment actually requires the maintenance of a
universal militia. After all, the opening clause of the Second Amendment begins, "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State ...."[122] Thus the Framers
considered a well-regulated militia to be, well, necessary to the security of a free (p.203)state.
[123] Add to this straightforward textual language what we know about the historical
background, particularly the Framers' Whiggish hostility toward standing armies,[124] and
the idea that the federal government, and perhaps the states as well, possess an absolute
obligation to maintain a universal militia seems reasonably well-founded. This intent is
evident in light of the 1792 Militia Act,[125] which is entirely consistent with this
understanding.
Of course, such a duty could be meaningless in practice. Similar obligations of the
federal government, after all, have largely been interpreted out of existence. The Guaranty
Clause of Article IV, Section 4,[126] for example, was the subject of judicial nearabnegation,[127] with its goal being achieved, if at all, by such other provisions as the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. In general, courts are far more willing to
entertain claims based on individual rights than on government obligation.[128]
In this light, the Second Amendment could be understood as an example of very
careful drafting indeed: a government obligation (to maintain a militia) coupled with an
individual right (to keep and bear arms) that ensures that the key element of a universal
militia (an armed citizenry) cannot be extinguished by government neglect.[129] At the
very least, the clear constitutional statement regarding the necessity of a well-regulated
(universal) militia for the security of a free state should give us pause. The logical
consequence of this statement is that a state lacking such a militia is either insecure or
unfree.[130] In light of what is known about the purposes of the (p.204)Second Amendment
and the Framers' views regarding standing armies and armed citizens, an interpretation of
the first clause of the Second Amendment as requiring universal militias seems wellfounded. It is certainly better grounded in the Constitution's text, history, and purposes than
many other constitutional arguments that have attained general acceptance.[131]
Nor is that the only consequence. Accepting, arguendo, that a court lacks the power to
order the creation of a universal militia, the absence of such a militia could still have legal
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(and political) consequences. One can imagine the following exchange between a
government representative and a member of one of today's neomilitias:
GOVERNMENT: You have no right to operate a private militia. The only militia
recognized under the Second Amendment is a state-sponsored militia. Private
groups have no standing.[132]
MILITIAMAN: A state-sponsored militia, eh? Which one is that?
GOVERNMENT: The National Guard, of course.[133]
MILITIAMAN: Don't be silly. The National Guard is not universal, and it isn't statecontrolled. At best, it's a select militia of the sort that the Framers disliked.
[134](p.205)
GOVERNMENT: Oh, all right. The truth is, we allowed the real militia to die. It wasn't
good for much. We couldn't even use it to invade Mexico or Canada.
Furthermore, the professional military didn't like it.[135]
MILITIAMAN: Fine. Because you admit you've defaulted on a constitutional obligation
that is "necessary to the security of a free state," we've resorted to self-help.
We'd rather see a universal militia of the sort the Framers envisioned, but only
the government can create that. We've done the best we could in light of your
default. And you should be estopped from complaining, until you have lived up
to your constitutional obligation.[136]
GOVERNMENT: But private militias are dangerous. They don't necessarily represent the
whole community; only portions of the community join such groups. They are
prone to being infiltrated by malcontents, and they scare people.[137]
MILITIAMAN: All true. That's why we should have a universal militia. Too bad you guys
have fallen down on the job.
Despite its half-whimsical treatment here, the argument is a serious one. (p.206)If a wellregulated militia of the sort the Framers envisioned is as important as a Communitarian
interpretation of the Second Amendment suggests, then there is a constitutional argument
for self-help in the event of a government default. Such an argument would likely fail in
court, but that does not necessarily diminish its political, or even its constitutional, force.
The easy solution is to take seriously the Second Amendment's first clause. Doing so,
however, is likely to pose problems for the Communitarians' stated goal of domestic
disarmament.
D. The Communitarian Militia
Critics will no doubt label militias as quaint anachronisms, unsuited for either modern
military service[138] or local law enforcement,[139] activities viewed as best left to
"professionals," though the recent record of some law enforcement professionals should
give one pause.[140] Despite what critics say, states continue to take their militias semiseriously: almost every state in the nation has a statute that designates the citizenry of a
specified age as the "unorganized militia" of the state.[141] Many states even have updated
their unorganized militia statutes in recent years to include women.[142] Although
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geopolitical realities probably preclude reliance on the militia as the keystone of our
military strategy, this is not a flaw of militias; rather, it speaks to the role the United States
has assumed in world affairs, a role the Framers had not likely intended. Using a militia to
service the security needs of states and communities, on the other hand, makes good sense
[143] (p.207)and can be done in a way that constitutes a perfect fit with Communitarian
principles.
In the eighteenth century, universality was viewed as the great virtue of militias.[144]
The militia was seen as incorruptible and thus incapable of tyranny because the diversity of
membership was thought to be a powerful guard against any one element in a community
gaining sway over the whole.[145] Militia service brought together community members
from varied backgrounds.[146] (Communitarian reticence about acknowledging the virtues
of militias is especially puzzling given the strong, community-centered and self-reliant
elements in the Communitarian platform.[147] ) Further, if cultivated, the militia could
reinforce the idea of duty to the polity in the deepest sense by obligating members to take
up arms for the community's defense and by accepting responsibility for the safety of
residents and visitors.[148] A (p.208)reconstituted militia serving individual communities
under the aegis of the state also would accomplish the Communitarian goal of resolving
problems by use of the smallest possible societal unit.[149]
More importantly, the existence of a citizen militia responsible in some way for the
security of a given community also might reintroduce responsibility into the administration
of law enforcement. Although law enforcement officials formerly were liable, for example,
in trespass for improperly serving a search warrant or for breaking into the wrong house to
make an arrest, legal fictions such as sovereign immunity and qualified immunity now
present almost insuperable barriers for citizens wishing to hold law enforcement officers
accountable for mistakes or abuses.[150] Further, the recent phenomenon of the
"militarization" of law enforcement at all levels of government evokes sinister analogies to
authoritarian regimes and the much feared "midnight knock at the door."[151] Professional
law enforcement officers clad in Nomex coveralls and face shields, after all, hardly seem to
represent the community even in their own minds, much less in the minds of many
onlookers. Encouraging communities to take responsibility for their security might also
have the effect of making those charged with law enforcement duties morally responsible to
their friends and neighbors, and thus help them exercise greater care and restraint in
carrying out their law enforcement duties. Though many might raise the specter of
vigilantism and argue for respecting the domain of law enforcement professionals,[152] the
recent behavior of some law enforcement agencies implies that a "professional" record is
not always something to which communities should aspire.[153] Likewise, charging
members of a community with its security will sensitize them to the link between rights and
responsibilities. Moreover, requiring that community members police the "rightsresponsibilities" boundary will highlight the social cost that accompanies the exercise of
rights in a diverse and plural community.[154](p.209)
A universal militia also would take advantage of some important characteristics of
human psychology.[155] At the risk of sounding too flip, if militias are outlawed, only
outlaws will join militias. Conversely, the establishment of a government-sponsored
universal militia would produce a very different dynamic. Rather than a way to rebel
against the status quo, militia service would be a means of community service, similar to
jury duty. As with jury duty, those lacking community spirit would probably devote their
energies to finding ways of avoiding service. A universal militia of a very different
character than the private groups extant today possess--a character far closer to what the
Framers envisioned would result.
Similarly, mandatory training in the use of arms in connection with militia service
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similarly would further important Communitarian goals. It could teach forbearance,
illustrating that the right to keep and bear arms does not give one the right to be a
"gunslinger." At the same time, arms education also would address one of the "clear and
present dangers" to the public health cited in the Communitarian platform: deaths caused by
accidental gunshot wounds.[156] A return to the Framers' universal militia, then, would
obviate the need for "domestic disarmament" by eliminating the platform's reason for it. In
addition, it would provide a meaningful Communitarian interpretation of the Second
Amendment, just as the Communitarian platform commands.[157]
One thing should be obvious from this discussion: in principle, it is possible to have
"community militias" composed of all law-abiding citizens or to have domestic
disarmament, but not both, as the Communitarian platform demands. If all law-abiding
citizens belong to the universal militia, then they will be armed; that is what belonging to a
militia means, as the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Miller.[158] The
platform does not address this contradiction, and the other Communitarian discussion of
guns is so unrelentingly hostile to gun ownership by individuals that it is difficult to believe
Communitarians take seriously their own beliefs in this context. As the following
discussion demonstrates, that is unfortunate.
III. TAKING COMMUNITARIANISM SERIOUSLY
Nothing captures the spirit of community present in militias quite like the following
passage from the late novelist Andrew Lytle's The Long Night:
You're too young to remember militia musters, but in my (p.210)boyhood they
were mighty fine gatherings. It was one of those days, I remember, when a man
didn't care what happened so long as he could feel his strength or try his skill.
....
It wasn't long until riders from every section of the county came in, some of
the younger and more spirited men shouting and taking on. But you'd see sober
gentlemen of middle years, sitting straight in their saddles, ride by in a running
walk as if they rode to musters every day. Those too poor to own stock, although
there were not many of this condition, straggled in on foot.... Kin would meet that
hadn't seen one another for a year or more; and the women would hardly run
through the ailments of children and servants, with just a running start on the
marriages and baptizing, when the musters came to an end. Such jollification you
never saw. There were dinners on the ground, and red-mouth barbecue pits. The
groceries knocked out the tops of their liquor barrels, and red whisky ran down
gullets like rain after a dry spell.[159]
Today we hear a great deal of yearning for the sort of community spirit that Lytle
describes. At one time, militia service instilled the virtues of self-sacrifice and self-control,
taught the safe use of arms, deterred both tyranny and invasion, and brought members of
various social groups together for socialization,[160] all while providing a socially
constructive outlet for citizens' martial impulses. One would expect Communitarians to
endorse wholeheartedly such an institution, but such an endorsement is conspicuously
absent.
Although there is probably little more enthusiasm outside Communitarian ranks for
the reconstitution of a universal militia, the unwillingness of Communitarians to entertain
the idea makes one a bit suspicious of their whole enterprise. Why does community begin
and end only with (disarmed) community service, responsibility, and forbearance? If
irresponsible use of weapons in our communities is a great problem (as it no doubt is), why
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rush to disarm everyone instead of creating an outlet through which responsible rightto-keep-and-bear-arms values might be transmitted? After all, in response to the problem of
fatalities caused by drunk drivers, (p.211)Etzioni merely argues that sobriety checkpoints are
reasonable[161] --he does not advocate the criminalization of alcohol or the banning of
automobiles. When it comes to a community's responsibility for defending home or
property, possibly through violence, one notes a deafening silence; although the platform
advocates a "Communitarian" interpretation of the Second Amendment, there is no hint of
how that should be effected, and the platform itself includes an obvious contradiction on the
subject. One would expect that a Communitarian ideal would demand community-related
virtues such as intellectual honesty and a self-critical stance toward one's own predilections.
As our analysis indicates, the Communitarians' treatment of this issue lacks at least one of
those virtues.
This omission in Communitarian analysis underscores a key flaw. It is impossible to
read the Communitarian literature without suspecting that the "community" envisioned by
most Communitarians looks much like Ann Arbor, Michigan; Charlottesville, Virginia; or
Cambridge, Massachusetts: communities with a disproportionate number of Volvos and
Montessori schools. There is nothing wrong with such communities; they are nice places to
live. It is a mistake, however, to think that the community values of Ann Arbor, for
example, are the only ones that matter, or should matter. America possesses many
communities where pickup trucks are more common than Volvos and where community
members believe in values that Communitarians find unimportant, such as independence
and the responsible use of arms.[162] Some of these communities have responded to the
Etzionis of the world, who they believe do not appreciate their values, by organizing their
own militias ("neomilitias"). The rise of such groups indicates the way in which elite
constitutional opinion has failed to mesh with, or even acknowledge, the deeply felt
sentiments of many Americans.[163] As we have seen, the dismissive attitudes that many
elite commentators display toward such sentiments mask what should be, cultural
differences aside, a surprising degree of common ground.[164]
Indeed, the common ground goes even farther. The rise of private "militias" can be
seen as the dark side of community and Communitarianism. Already there are signs that in
a few areas in which militia groups are active, some have attempted to constitute a law unto
themselves,[165] recognizing no authority but their own and cloaking their usurpation (p.212)
in high-sounding rhetoric about illegitimacy and tyranny.[166] History is rife with private
community groups which, with the tacit support of government, seek to impose their will on
disfavored members of a community.[167] These "intermediate organizations" are often
even more sinister when they are armed. Although many Communitarians have failed to
address this issue, "Neorepublican" theorists in legal academia have acknowledged that the
power of these intermediate organizations that Communitarianism or republicanism is
supposed to encourage must be subject to some regulation. Professor Cass Sunstein, for
example, notes the importance of government not completely surrendering important
responsibilities to private organizations.[168] At the same time, however, Sunstein believes
that despite the potential for abuse that exists with the emergence of intermediate
institutions, the answer is not simply for the government to attempt to eliminate them. To
the contrary, Sunstein writes that "[g]overnment must therefore play a role in limiting the
power of such organizations without denying the importance of their continued
existence."[169] The classical universal militia, of course, was designed to play just such a
role, yet it receives no credit in Communitarian writings.
That is unfortunate. The more that Communitarians and other members of the elite
stigmatize gun-ownership and call for vigorous prosecution of gun owners and neomilitia
members, the more extremists will be attracted to both. Moreover, given that seventy-five
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percent of Americans believe the Constitution protects the right to keep and bear arms,
[170] attempts to demonize gun ownership and calls for "domestic disarmament" in the
name of "community," or some equally amorphous collective ideal, could result in (p.213)a
loss of legitimacy that would pose a much greater threat to communities in the long run.
Similarly, considering the prominence given the militia in the Constitution and in its
underlying ideology, and the failure to maintain the institution as the country has
developed, it is not surprising that intermediate institutions have arisen to fill the vacuum
left by the demise of the traditional militia. Here too, it seems that should a government
adhering to Communitarian principles wish to control the power of the neomilitias, it has
the concomitant responsibility to establish an alternative structure into which might be
channeled the militia-like impulses of its citizens.
It is possible that community might somehow be achieved through Habitat-forHumanity style group projects, extensive discourse, and the creation of conditions
necessary for "social justice."[171] As the community gets larger, however, and as the
powers the "community" exercises are granted to bodies increasingly remote from those for
whose benefit the powers are supposed to be exercised, our antennae ought to be set
aquiver. The twentieth century surely has taught that more long term destruction has been
committed in the name of the "community" than by "radical individualists." According to
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, in this century, "the number
of people killed by their own governments under authoritarian regimes is four times the
number killed in all this century's wars combined."[172] As writer Hannah Arendt reminds
us, "It was not out of a desire for freedom that people eventually demanded their share in
government or admission to the political realm, but out of mistrust in those who held the
power over their life and goods."[173] Advocates of Communitarianism, whose numbers
(judging from the number of new books) seem to be growing, would do well to consider the
logical implications of their newfound "third way" and consider whether their position on
the Second Amendment dictates that the cartridge box be restored, along with the ballot box
and the jury box, as a hallmark of civic responsibility and a vehicle for the transmission of
civic virtue. If they are not willing to consider this implication of their thinking, perhaps we
should not take them very seriously in the future.
Alas, however, the failure to consider seriously the implications of their own positions
is hardly a monopoly of the Communitarians. For example, Judge Robert Bork and other
right-wing constitutional scholars have famously failed to consider that the very
constitutional theories they champion (p.214)must sometimes lead to results they abhor.[174]
Nor are the Communitarians the only ones to practice such one-eyed constitutional
interpretation with regard to the Second Amendment.[175] Although a certain amount of
excess enthusiasm for one's own arguments is only human, academics should rise above
such sentiments to the extent possible. As a movement started by academics, and as one that
celebrates forbearance and the subordination of self-gratification for the good of the
community, Communitarianism should be relatively free from such sins. The fact that it is
not free suggests that honest, self-critical constitutional scholarship must be a very difficult
thing indeed.
That is unfortunate, because constitutional scholarship is important, and honest
constitutional scholarship plays, or should play, an important role in our society as a check
on the actions of judges and politicians. Faithful interpretation of the Constitution is
difficult, and, if done honestly and consistently, it is certain to generate at least some
answers that the interpreter does not like. Thus, we should be suspicious of those whose
constitutional theories generate only answers they find congenial, regardless of their
ideological stripe. Unfortunately, constitutional scholarship that passes this test appears to
be in short supply.
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We have no solution to this problem beyond that offered by the Communitarians:
suasion. We hope that as a result of our criticisms, and, no doubt, those of others, the
Communitarians will revisit their views on this issue and at least consider that their own
approach, if taken seriously, may produce answers other than the "domestic disarmament"
they so clearly desire. In this much, at least, we agree with the Communitarians: dialogue is
important. We hope that our contribution to the debate will promote more thinking about
both Communitarianism and the Second Amendment.
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that "'unhappy nations have lost the precious jewel liberty ... [because] their necessities or indiscretion have
permitted a standing army to be kept amongst them'").
[83] See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 507 (1975).
[84] See generally WOOD, supra note 7, at 46-90 (describing the intellectual foundations of
republicanism); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1695, 1734 (1989) (contrasting republicanism with liberalism).
[85] See generally WOOD, supra note 7, at 46-90; Gey, supra note 67, at 804-06.
[86] See STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 60 (1984).
[87] Id. at 61-63.
[88] Id. at 63.
[89] GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND
AMENDMENT XXXVI (Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1994). The same observation might be made about arms-bearing by
individuals in general, which was felt to promote virtue and encourage responsibility. Thomas Jefferson
extolled the virtues of guns in a letter to his nephew:
As to the species of exercise, I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the body, it
gives boldness, enterprise, and independence to the mind. Games played with the ball, and others of
that nature, are too violent for the body, and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun, therefore,
be the constant companion of your walks.
1 THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P. Foley ed., Russell & Russell 1967) (1900). See also MCDONALD,
supra note 7, at 74 ("Virtue meant manliness, and manliness meant independence.... [A]nd this independence ...
was 'in the last analysis measured by his ability to bear arms and use them in his own quarrels.'") (quoting
J.G.A. Pocock); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 771-72 (1994) (discussing the
connection between a militia composed of the body of the people and the meaning of a "republican"
government).
[90] See, e.g., Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the
Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 659 (1995) (arguing that "[r]eliance
upon civilian militias during the Revolution ... proved to be 'militarily disastrous.'") (quoting BRUCE D.
PORTER, WAR AND THE RISE OF THE STATE 249 (1994)). But see Brannon P. Denning, Palladium of Liberty?:
Causes and Consequences of the Federalization of State Militias in the Twentieth Century, 21 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 1997) (noting that although criticized by professional soldiers, the militias proved
adept at inflicting considerable losses on the British and, due to their close ties with their communities,
preventing significant counterrevolutionary activity).
[91] See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
[92] See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 384-89 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
(1937).
[93] See id. at 387-88.
[94] See id. at 388 (describing the militia clauses of the Constitution).
[95] Id.
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[96] See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress 1791-1793, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 606, 640-44 (1996) (describing the debates over a uniform militia bill).
[97] The Militia Act provided:
That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a
good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with
a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or
firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle,
knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a
pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutered and provided, when called out to exercise,
or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without
a knapsack.
Militia Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (repealed 1903). This represented the major Congressional action
regarding the militia until the twentieth century.
[98] THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 209-10 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987) (arguing that
any attempt to "disciplin[e] all of the militia of the United States" through national musters and compulsory
exercises would be regarded as "a real grievance to the people and a serious public inconvenience and loss").
[99] In his influential treatise on the Constitution, Joseph Story editorialized about the decline of the
militias and the attendant dangers accompanying such attitudes:
[T]hough ... the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be
disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia
discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is
practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is
certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus
gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.
3 STORY, supra note 78, at 677.
[100] Of course, one also might argue that there was a noticeable decline in "civic virtue," with more
and more citizens seeking to escape their militia duties as the threat of invasions and insurrections began to
subside. See id. at 746.
[101] For example, despite the inexcusable neglect that militias often suffered at the hands of niggardly
state legislatures, many units still performed admirably during the War of 1812, most notably during the Battle
of New Orleans. See Denning, supra note 90 (describing militia successes in the War of 1812).
[102] See JOHN K. MAHON, THE WAR OF 1812, at 51 (1972); see also infra Part II.B.
[103] Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (repealed 1956).
[104] Patrick Todd Mullins, Note, The Militia Clauses, The National Guard, and Federalism: A
Constitutional Tug of War, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 328, 333 (1988) (detailing the history of the federalization
of the militia system and the concomitant erosion of state control over an ostensibly state institution).
[105] Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399 (amending Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775).
[106] Id. at 400. This focus on the military as a means to project the United States' power worldwide is
just the sort of vice that results from the maintenance of a standing army. Because the militia clauses of the
Constitution seem to limit the militia's role to one of defense, this portion of the act was deemed
unconstitutional in a United States Attorney General's opinion which stated that militias could not be sent to a
foreign country. See Authority of President to Send Militia Into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322
(1912).
[107] National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (current version in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C. and 32 U.S.C.).
[108] See Mullins, supra note 104, at 334. The Supreme Court upheld this constitutional end-run in
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (holding that the power to draft members of the National Guard
into the U.S. Army and the power to compel civilians to render military service was granted to the President by
the Constitution).
[109] Mullins, supra note 104, at 335. The right of the states to appoint their own officers was an
important concession to Antifederalists during the debates. It was thought that state militia units would be less
susceptible to corruption if under federal control than if units remained under the command of "sons of the
state." In modern parlance, the states' retention of the power to appoint officers ensured that militias would stay
rooted in their community.
[110] Id. at 334 n.66.
[111] National Defense Act of 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153, 160.
[112] Id. at 161.
[113] Id.
[114] Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481, 489.
[115] The "Montgomery Amendment" to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 provides that
"[t]he consent of a Governor ... may not be withheld (in whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the
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United States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type,
or schedule of such active duty." National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. 99-661, sec. 522, §
12301, 100 Stat. 3871 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 12301(f) (1984)). The Supreme Court found this amendment to
be constitutional in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 337 (1990).
[116] See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT 148 (1994) ("Because of their long-standing prejudice against a select militia as constituting a form of
standing army liable to be skewed politically and dangerous to liberty, every state had created a general
militia.").
[117] Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S.
Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 384 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
[118] See generally JOHN GARRY CLIFFORD, THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS: THE PLATTSBURG TRAINING
CAMP MOVEMENT, 1913-1920 (1972) (describing early twentieth century efforts to institute universal military
training in the United States).
[119] See, e.g., Larry Rohter, County Creates Militia To Defend Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1994, at A14 (describing a unanimous vote of the Santa Rosa County, Florida County Commission establishing
a militia and making every man, woman, and child in the county eligible for service).
[120] At most, civic republicans advocate a host of governmental reforms that are supposed to capture
the militia spirit. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 25, at 603-04 (listing alternative "virtue functions" that could
be performed by "militia surrogates").
[121] See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 253-54 (noting that the Communitarian platform preamble states
that "[n]either human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and
overlapping communities to which we all belong").
[122] U.S. CONST. amend. II.
[123] See Dunlap, supra note 117, at 384-85.
[124] See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
[125] Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903).
[126] U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
[127] Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the "United States shall guarantee to every
State in the Union a Republican Form of Government." This provision is regarded as essentially meaningless by
most lawyers today, but there is no doubt that the Framers intended it to grant the national government power to
act in the event that a state government became tyrannical. It is generally poor lawyering to argue that any part
of the Constitution lacks meaning, and there is no basis for such an assertion in the context of the Guaranty
Clause. The case generally cited for the proposition that the Guaranty Clause is a nullity is Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. 1 (1849). That case, however, merely stated that the clause is not susceptible to direct judicial enforcement,
something made clear later in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). Such a holding is
not at all inconsistent with the notion that the federal government lacks power under the Guaranty Clause. It
merely indicates that such power is held in the first instance by Congress or the Executive branch, not by the
judiciary.
[128] See generally SANDEL, supra note 5, at 25-54 (noting that the Supreme Court views protecting
individual rights as a priority).
[129] See COOLEY, supra note 79, at 729.
[130] See William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236, 1243-44 (1994). Van Alstyne writes that
the Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the right of the people to keep and bear arms as
the predicate for the other provision to which it speaks, i.e., the provision respecting a militia, as
distinct from a standing army separately subject to congressional regulation and control. Specifically,
it looks to an ultimate reliance on the common citizen who has a right to keep and bear arms rather
than only to some standing army, or only to some other politically separated, defined, and detached
armed cadre, as an essential source of security of a free state.... [The Second Amendment] expressly
embraces that right and indeed it erects the very scaffolding of a free state upon that guarantee. It
derives its definition of a well-regulated militia in just this way for a "free State": The militia to be
well-regulated is a militia to be drawn from just such people (i.e., people with a right to keep and bear
arms) rather than from some other source (i.e., from people without rights to keep and bear arms).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
[131] Id. at 1255.
[132] For arguments in support of this position, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 488-96 (1995) (describing the "States' Right Model" of the Second
Amendment).
[133] See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth
Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 36-38 (1989) (discussing the creation
of the National Guard as an organized form of the militia).
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[134] See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1166
(1991):
Nowadays, it is quite common to speak loosely of the National Guard as "the state militia," but 200
years ago, any band of paid, semiprofessional, part-time volunteers, like today's Guard, would have
been called "a select corps" or "select militia"--and viewed in many quarters as little better than a
standing army. In 1789, when used without any qualifying adjective, "the militia" referred to all
Citizens capable of bearing arms.... [Thus,] the "militia" is identical to "the people ...."
Id. (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
[135] Or as David Williams opined,
Those who support a states' rights view of the militia seek to identify the Amendment's militia with
the National Guard. The Guard, however, is a select body, only a fraction of the population.... The
universal militia, by contrast, was the people under another name; it could not turn against the people
because it was the people. As the National Guard is not universal, it cannot serve as a substitute.
Williams, supra note 25, at 589 (footnotes omitted); see also William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia
and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (suggesting that the National Guard should
be considered "troops" raised with the consent of Congress under Article I, Section 10, rather than a "militia").
[136] See Denning, supra note 90.
[137] See Williams, supra note 25, at 553-54 (describing civilian militias and their relationship to the
Second Amendment as "terrifying").
[138] This argument was made in the 1940s. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the
Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 189-93 (1940).
[139] See MALCOLM, supra note 116, at 2-3 (describing the duties of medieval English citizens to patrol
their towns and villages and to pursue criminals).
[140] See, e.g., Jeremy Pearce, Drugs and Big Money Tempt Cops Across the Country, DET. NEWS,
May 3, 1996, at A7, available in 1996 WL 2917542; Graham Rayman, More Allegations of Bad Cops,
NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 15, 1996, at A24, available in 1996 WL 2533174.
[141] See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; IOWA CONST. art. VI, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. IX, § 214;
N.M. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;
S.D. CONST. art. XV, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XV, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; ALA. CODE § 31-2-2
(1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-61-10 1(b) (Michie 1994); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 122 (West 1994); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 27-1 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 46-102 (1994); IND. CODE
ANN. § 10-2-3-1 (Michie 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e) (1993); KY. CONST. § 219 (1993); MINN. STAT.
§ 190.06 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-2(B) (Michie 1994); N.Y. MIL. LAW § 2(2) (McKinney 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 33-2-2 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-104(d) (Michie 1994); WYO. STAT. § 192-102(a) (1994).
[142] See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 46-105 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e) (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
30-1-3 (1994).
[143] This is particularly true in light of the rather appalling string of pronouncements from state courts
which conclude that because local police departments have a duty to protect everyone generally, they are
responsible for protecting no one in particular. See, e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.
1981) ("[A] fundamental principle [of American law is] that a government and its agents are under no general
duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen."). Any attempted
restoration of "collective responsibility" or a community's "moral voice" is likely doomed to failure if the
community members will not come to one another's aid even when there is little risk of harm to the rescuer.
[144] See Williams, supra note 25, at 577-79.
[145] Id.
[146] See id. at 580. Williams writes,
[Militia m]embership was service to the state that always disrupted one's chosen round of activities
and often involved hunger, cold, disease, and danger. The militia member was expected to bear these
burdens with the knowledge that he was keeping the republic safe. The experience of working
together with fellow citizens could cement this perspective of self-sacrifice to the common good.
Militia service required cooperation among citizens and subordination to orders, [and] stimulated a
commitment to comrades that would become a devotion to the public that they represented ....
Id. (footnotes omitted). Similarly, the late novelist Andrew Lytle described a typical militia muster in his novel,
The Long Night. Lytle emphasized that such an assembly brought together those from all socio-economic
classes. ANDREW LYTLE, THE LONG NIGHT 23 (1936); see infra note 159 and accompanying text. Cf. ETZIONI,
supra note 1, at 114. Etzioni describes a mandatory year of national service for high school graduates as
an important community builder because it would act as a grand sociological mixer.... A year of
national service, especially if it was designed to enable people from different geographical and
sociological backgrounds to work and live together, could be an effective way for boys and girls,
whites and nonwhites, people from parochial and public schools, north and south, the city and the
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country, to come together constructively while working together at a common task.
Id.
[147] See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
[148] See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also MALCOLM, supra note 116, at 2-3 (noting
that from the early Middle Ages in England, "the law made residents of a parish liable for compensating a
victim of a robbery or riot committed in their parish for half of his loss").
[149] See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
[150] See generally Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies
for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 158 (discussing the qualified immunity defense).
[151] See Military Police, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 3, 1995, at N12, available in 1995 WL 10049369; Jim
Nesbitt, Under Fire: If Police Departments View Themselves as an Army, Who Is the Enemy?, SUNDAY
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 28, 1995, at G1, available in 1995 WL 5064837.
[152] See Crossing the Line: Patriots and the Militias, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 4, 1996, at B6,
available in 1996 WL 7719447.
[153] See Pearce, supra note 140, at A7; Rayman, supra note 140, at A24.
[154] See GLENDON, supra note 5, at 1-17.
[155] See Williams, supra note 25, at 563.
[156] See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 265.
[157] See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
[158] 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); see supra note 80 (discussing Miller).
[159] LYTLE, supra note 146, at 23. Lytle's narrative continues with descriptions of speech making,
wrestling, and other games of strength, followed by a fight, though as Lytle's narrator puts it: "One or two men
were cut up right smart, but nobody got involved in a killing. Men settled their disputes in those days with their
fists." Id. at 24.
[160] See Williams, supra note 25, at 577-80.
[161] See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 170-73.
[162] See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 16, at 18.
[163] See LASCH, supra note 33, at 25-49.
[164] See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 134-47 (discussing Communitarian principles of strengthening
institutions, personal responsibility, self-help, and social justice).
[165] See Corn, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that "many militiamen have turned their energies toward
setting up so-called common law courts ... over whom the federal government has no authority").
[166] See Williams, supra note 25, at 582.
[167] See Joelle E. Polesky, The Rise of Private Militia: A First and Second Amendment Analysis of the
Right to Organize and the Right to Train, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1604 (1996).
[168] See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1574. Sunstein writes that
intermediate organizations serve a variety of important functions, but recognition of that point does
not eliminate the need to describe the appropriate role of the state and national governments.
....
An approach that sees the locus of republican virtues exclusively in private institutions
undervalues the distinctive capacities of the state. In view of those capacities, political deliberation
and citizenship must occur within public institutions as well.
Id.
[169] Id.
[170] According to a poll taken in the spring of 1995, most Americans believe citizens possess such a
right. In that poll, respondents were asked, "Do you agree that the Constitution guarantees you the right to own
a gun?" Seventy-five percent of those polled agreed; only 18% disagreed. See The Fight to Bear Arms, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 22, 1995, at 29.
[171] The backlash to Communitarianism and neorepublicanism is building. See James A. Gardner, Shut
Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996); Linda
C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994).
[172] Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995, 1025-26
n.141 (1995) (quoting Shattuck).
[173] HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 150 (Penguin Books 1993) (1961).
[174] See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1992)
(criticizing right-wing attacks on Griswold v. Connecticut as inconsistent with original understanding); Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original
Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045 (1990) (same).
[175] See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United
States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 (1996) (criticizing lower courts for
misinterpreting Miller because of the disapproval of the Second Amendment in general); Glenn Harlan
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Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995) (discussing how a states' rights interpretation of the Second Amendment leads to
a result that supporters of such an interpretation dislike).
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